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A symmetric approach
The EU was founded on replacing the principle of direct reciprocity with compliance
to common rules: instead of slapping tariffs or sanctions on each other member
states would bind themselves to, say, common competition law rules. This is what
happens within the EU. And yet, when it comes to third countries, the EU has had
no compunction in requiring unilateral adoption of its standards by the rest of the
world as a condition for access to its market, without others having a say in such
standards. Fair enough, this is what you do when you are a regulatory hegemon.
The problem with Brexit is that the UK is making this fundamental asymmetry visible
and contestable. Remainers may be right that the best way to avoid becoming a 
“vassal state” is to stay around the table. But short of a reversal, the EU must come
to terms with the fact that the UK cannot acquiesce to business as usual. 
While this is a challenge for upcoming negotiations on the future relationship, Brexit
2.0, the problem is foreshadowed in the withdrawal protocol on the backstop.
This is in effect the issue that Joseph Weiler, Daniel Sarmiento and Jonathan Faull
seek to address in their Verfassungsblog proposal. They suggest that the best way
to avoid a no-deal Brexit, even at the 11th hour, would be to adopt “a regime of
dual autonomy” (the Ulster Unionists put forth similar proposals over the weekend).
To summarise, this implies that each side is expected to enforce the other side’s
standards for exported goods. This would mean that the EU and UK would each
maintain their own customs and regulatory regimes but use all the mechanisms
under their control to protect each others' standards. Compliance would be ensured
through mechanisms such as non-frontier spot checks and making non compliance a
criminal effect. 
This approach amounts in effect to changing the backstop in three ways: i) the UK
would not stay in the single market and customs union (avoiding asymmetry); ii) the
integrity of the single market would still be guaranteed but only by bringing to bear
the force of the UK’s rule of law’ on exports to the EU and the EU would do the same
(establishing symmetry).
It may be the case that this is "inadequate and not anywhere near the landing zone"
as a senior EU source told the BBC News. No ZOPA (zone of possible agreement)
at this stage of the negotiations would mean that we can only head towards no deal
Brexit or no Brexit at all. 
But we can also entertain the thought that reciprocity or symmetry is indeed a
necessary if not a sufficient condition for the backstop compass to lead us to a
landing zone. 
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Six ingredients need to be added to the mix: a dynamic backstop, a compatibility
assumption, a new reading EU of history, turning the precedent concern around,
empowering local institutions, distinguishing positions and interests.
First: a dynamic backstop 
The parties could agree more clearly that the backstop is a dynamic mechanism.
  For one, the EU can do more to reassure the UK governemnt that the backstop
is only relevant to the extent that so called “alternative arrangements” relying on
technological means to avoid a border in Ireland are yet incapable of avoiding a
border in Ireland. 
Prime Minister Boris Johnson has abundantly  mentioned in his selling pitch around
Europe the Prosperity report on alternative arrangements, drafted by a Commission
chaired by MPs Greg Hand and Nicky Morgan. The report proposes a range of
solutions – without transposing other border arrangements to NI. These include
avoiding one-size-fits-all arrangements and futuristic high-tech solutions; use of
Enhanced Economic Zones; trusted trader programmes; sanitary and phyto-sanitary
checks carried out away from the border; building upon existing common all-island
regimes; use of the Norway/Switzerland Transit system at the border. 
The EU is right that the alternative arrangements do not do the same job as the
backstop. But everyone also agrees that a paradigm shift is in the making in border
management, for better or worse. These are not fantasy unicorns, only unicorns to
be born. The parties only disagree about timing and the extent to which these are
sufficient to guarantee the integrity of the single market. The drafters of the AAC
report recognise that their proposals cannot be deployed fast. They say within 2 or
3 years while others say it will take longer. Let an impartial referee adjudicate when
the time comes even if the two parties retain ultimate control. New technology can
be introduced and progressively trusted, while the regulatory approach to alternative
arrangements is deployed.
Second: a deal based on core convergence and
broad compatibility. 
Turning then to the regulatory side, since the backstop is a hypothetical proxy for
a future relationship deal,  it is not unreasonable to design it in its long shadow as
article 50 spells out, albeit ambiguously.
Clearly, this amended backstop requires mutual trust – but as Weiler rightly argues
that is already the case if the UK were to stay in the single market as the backstop
envisages.  But since it is difficult to assuage the further concern that it would be
possible to diverge from each other’s standards under the proposal, the amended
backstop needs to distinguish between core convergence and broad compatibility.
Few disagree that core convergence and common standards need to be retained
where the island can only be one single ecosystem, especially by continuing to
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respect EU law on food standards and protect human health. There would be no
need to check such products at the point of entry (eg the NI border) under the
backstop as agreed. This would not change.
More broadly, however, it is not unreasonable to assume that a former member state
like the UK will remain EU-compatible, not only on day one but thereafter, probably
more so than many less developed member states – this is true for the existing
version of the backstop or for whatever could replace it.  
In this spirit, it makes sense that both the backstop and the broader future deal
recognise the extraordinary level of supervisory collaboration and trust that already
exists between regulators on both sides. It is a mistake to believe that a few months
of acrimonious negotiations can erase almost four decades of working together in
the EU.
I refer in detail to this mindset and its concrete implications as the compatibility
model acknowledging on both sides that access to the EU’s Single Market is
neither about ‘managing convergence’ as with enlargement, nor about ‘managing
divergence’ as the Brexiters dream and the EU fears, but about ‘managing
differences’. Compatibility is not conformity. The compatibility paradigm suggests
that it is wrong to decide a priori that potential future differences in regulatory
approaches will necessarily overshoot the bounds of legitimate differences. The
European legal imagination has for many decades populated the space between
regulatory independence and subservience with numerous notions labelled
approximation, inter-operability, regulatory coherence proportionality, balancing and
functional equivalence, which apply differently to different sectors. Why should it be
afraid of this legal philosophy?
Third: the parties need to engage with the EU
history of managed mutual recognition 
Which leads us to the third ingredient for a successful deal. An EU official
commented that the Verfassunsblog proposal was a repeat of Theresa May’s
doomed Chequers plan, rejected by Brussels.
This concern must be engaged with. For one, by acknowledging that the philosophy
of the amended backstop of course is not new. When prime minister Theresa May
first spoke of mutual recognition in her Mansion Speech House in London on 2
March 2018 spelling out British aspirations for the future relationship, some of us
(including my colleague Stephen Weatherhill on this Verfassungsblog blog, and
myself here and in my book) sought to strike a balance between those who praised it
uncritically and those who only heard unicorn-speech. 
I believe that the Verfassungsblog proposal falls into this middle category, putting
forth a minimalist version of a managed mutual recognition regime with maximal
enforcement guarantees, which respects the integrity of the single market.
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True. When the EU rightly seeks to protect the “integrity of the single market” we are
referred to the OD definition of integrity as “the state of being whole and undivided.”
  But integrity is also about “adherence to consistent principles over time.”  In this
spirit, the EU ought to recognise the margins of freedom offered by the history of the
single market which provides subtle guidelines rather than fixed rules for interpreting
the contours of such integrity. 
There are two lessons in particular. 
Lesson one is that the single market has been built over time in a piecemeal and
pragmatic way around the principle of mutual recognition, underpinned by rigorous
adjudication of disputes where they arise. Countries of destination are asked to trust
the home state to provide the right stamp for goods and services crossing borders.
But because trust is never blind between states, there is no such thing in the EU as
pure mutual recognition. Instead, the EU Single Market has become a complex and
layered system of managed mutual recognition, a recognition which can be partial,
conditional and reversible, and involve more or less alignment. Even when more
harmonisation is introduced, we still at a minimum need mutual recognition of how
the rules are enforced.
This is an ingenious dynamic process, involving trade-offs that may change over
time. Ironically, it was devised to a great extent by Brits in Brussels precisely to avoid
one-size-fits-all standards and supervision, allowing for a high degree of national
regulatory autonomy. 
By invoking mutual recognition out of context, Brexiters failed to acknowledge that
they have set out to reinvent the EU wheel but without the gears and spokes that
make it work, otherwise known as institutions. They failed to recognise what it means
to access an entire regime of mutual recognition rather than a single country that
would simply recognise you. 
This is in part why Brussels has been so suspicious of the British offer in the past
two years. Yet, the EU might consider the idea that to take away recognition ought to
be harder than to grant it initially. It might thus decide imaginatively to explore a new
dynamic version of regulatory managed mutual recognition for Britain. If it does, the
minimalist version suggested by the Verfassungsblog proposal would merely be a
hint in this direction (since it is not meant to be invoked anyway).
Lesson two is that the EU has been seeking to export the Single Market model
to the rest of the world for decades. It is fair to say that this ambition has worked
better as an asymmetrical exercise, for example in Norway, than a symmetrical
exercise, as in the United States. And that the so-called mutual recognition deals the
EU did manage to strike with outside partners are but pale imitations of the original,
involving what the minimalist Weiler et al. proposal puts forth, e.g. the recognition
that exporters certify to the importing country standards (6 such sectorial mutual
recognition agreements were signed with the USA in the 1990s). If every external
trade deal negotiated between the EU and third countries in the last two decades
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has included a chapter on regulatory cooperation, these have remained long-term
horizons. 
Here is the thing. With Brexit, the EU can now experiment with a country that could
live on both these horizons. As a former member state the UK will not simply be a
new exemplar of EU Story Two. It will have been an integral part of EU Story One.
If there is no precedent for such a state of affairs, we can invent a new paradigm
consistent with the EU’s own history and principles. 
Negotiators may object that we are not currently negotiating the future relationship,
so these considerations are irrelevant. Yet, the rebuttals to the amended backstop
are in fact also commentaries on the future relationship. If the political declaration
can be amended to reflect a bold and ambitious vision of that relationship, one
whereby Brexit is a staircase between EU Stories One and Two, this opens a space
for amending the backstop in the same spirit. 
The backstop is but a first stone in this edifice.
Fourth: ambition not concession, or turning the
precedent story on its head
Can the EU contemplate a UK both on the outer ring of its own managed mutual
recognition system – Story One – and as the new frontier of its external mutual
recognition ambition – Story Two? 
Indeed the political declaration already makes clear that if it wants access to the
single market, it will need to respect the spirit of internal EU law, which is not about
accommodating ad hoc and idiosyncratic exceptions but about refining a principled
approach over time. And because things change over time, including levels of trust,
the deal needs to involve a good dose of contingent contracting, predicated on
accommodating different expectations. 
Evolutionary clauses are the bread and butter of international law and can provide
the basis for a dynamic Brexit as well as a dynamic backstop. 
Managed mutual recognition relies heavily on conflict management, remedies in
case of disagreement and political decisions on whether to stick with incompatibilities
that may arise or take the hit in terms of market access. Because the UK will
be only partially involved in the EU’s eco-system of recognition management,
these technologies of conflict will need to be robust and operate in the shadow
of the Courts on each side. The EU will have the power to manage incompatible
regulations when the problem arises. To be sure, it is wrong to think that mutual
recognition from outside can look and feel the same as mutual recognition for
members of the club (there will be more asymmetry, reciprocity and reversibility). But
it is not clear why it should be denied altogether or reduced to bare-bone unilaterally
granted and revoked equivalence.
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Would others trade partners consider this as a precedent to follow suit? Not if they
are not as EU-compatible as this uniquely compatible former member state. Global
non-discrimination clauses do not apply if you are different. It is not true that anything
offered to the UK must be offered to others. The unique status of the UK credibly
justifies a special partnership.
The narrative here maters. After all, the EU has made it its great mission in life
to save free trade, battling against its detractors, all the while overcoming the
devastating perverse effects of globalisation denounced by Europhobes. If Brexit is
to be the measure of the EU’s free and fair trade credibility, the most unprecedented
of events could come to serve as a precedent which may one day inspire the EU’s
relations with a broader circle of countries, starting with its neighbours, which over
the next decades can progressively be brought within the ambit of the EU’s managed
mutual recognition system. This could in turn inspire new post-colonial EU thinking
on reciprocity when dealing with third countries. And the compatibility model could
eventually inspire global partnerships for economic governance.
In this spirit, the compatibility paradigm can turn on its head the narrative that
Brexit is a bad precedent. Brexit could come to stand in the court of history not as a
disastrous internal precedent but as an ambitious external precedent, a reinvention
of the EU’s managed mutual recognition approach to fit its role in the world as a
reliable hub in a turbulent world. Does the EU want to convince the world of its
commitment to free trade, cooperation and openness? If so, today the backstop,
tomorrow its future relationship with the UK, will be the test.
Fifth: subsidiarity calls for embedding the proposed
agreement in local institutions
But of course, who says autonomy calls for trust: I trust you to enforce my
regulations.  Who should be thus entrusted? The relevant regulatory authority of
course. But I believe that the importance of the local layer in this equation should be
further stressed. 
After all, back in 1998, the good Friday agreement (GFA) set up institutions
for shared democratic responsibility and mutual adjustment including on the
implementation of the single market. Strand One, on the character of devolution to
Northern Ireland institutions;  Strand Two, on the framework for cooperation and joint
implementation between the North and South of Ireland and crucially mechanisms
to channel local views to European institutions; and Strand Three, on East-West
coordination, between the Republic and the UK. 
Arguably, these institutions all need new impetus, but if this can happen, they can
be the first port of call for the mutual enforcement responsibilities laid out in the
proposal. They can be  entrusted with re-building trust around border issues after
Brexit, thus more explicitly linking the backstop or its alternative to the operational
integrity of the Good Friday Agreement. If there is to be a legal addendum to
supplement the withdrawal agreement it could be re-embedded firmly in the GFA,
and above all Strand 2.  
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In sum, the GFA is not the problem that the backstop sought to solve but can support
the solution to the problems the backstop has raised. If the need to implement the
single market informed the peace process, the GFA institutions can now inform
Brexit’s Withdrawal agreement. The north-south institutions would be strengthened
and charged with ensuring the continued compatibility between, on one hand, the
no-border commitment, and, on the other hand, single market requirements; while
charged with supervising the respective enforcement of the other side’s rules.
Granting the GFA institutions a key role in border management would be the best
institutional anchor for the  reciprocal approach suggested by the proposal. It does
not obfuscate the EU role in managing one of its external border, but at the same
time, all three Strands also underline the role of the UK in the process.
Sixth: how to get there
Even were the parties to agree on some version of an amended backstop, how
should they save face given their respective commitment that withdrawal agreement
is either dead or un-negotiable? Clearly, they will need to turn it into Schroedinger’s
cat, both dead and alive at the same time. The amended proposal goes a long way
in achieving this miracle by suggesting that the approach be laid out in the political
declaration, with a clause in the (therefore amended) backstop referring back to
the wording and granting it legal value as the withdrawal agreement. As others
have pointed out, the backstop is currently written as a protocol, separate to the
withdrawal agreement, so technically, the EU keeps its withdrawal agreement while
the UK has got rid of the backstop as it stands. 
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